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Abstract 
This paper examins the seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions, specifically, do insiders prefer 
to trade on any particular day of the week or month of the year? It also, given that such seasonal patterns exist, 
attempts to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies in returns (and 
volumes). The results outlined from this paper includes: There is a day of the week anomaly in aggregate insider 
activities (as measured by number and value of insider transactions). Particularly, relative to other days, insiders 
tend to trade more on Fridays and less on Tuesdays. Also, the distribution of the average value of directors‟ 
trades (buys and sells) across the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week 
(Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). Also, there is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider 
activities (as measured by the number of insider transactions). Insiders tend to trade most frequently in March 
and least in August. The results of OLS Regression Model indicate that there is no monthly anomaly in aggregate 
insider selling activities as measured by the aggregate value of insider transactions. The results of TOBIT 
Regression Model show that the average value of directors‟ selling activities in March is higher and significantly 
different relative to other months of the year. The results of OLS regression are also confirmed by the results of 
K-W statistic test which supported the non existence of monthly anomaly in aggregate director trading 
(measured by the value of director transactions). 
Keywords: director trading, informativeness, patterns, industry classification 
1. Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that at any given time, prices fully reflect all available 
information on a particular stock market. The weak form of the market efficiency hypothesis suggests that the 
current price fully incorporates all the information contained in the record of past share prices. Thus, no investor 
can gain an advantage in predicting the return on a stock using past price observations. The empirical literature 
in this area is vast. For example, a number of seasonality or calendar anomalies in equity trading, such as the 
Day-of-the Week, Month-of-the Year, or turn of the year (January effect), amongst others, have challenged the 
weak form of the EMH. The existence of these anomalies may indicate market inefficiency, which in turn 
provides a possibility for market participants to gain abnormal returns by creating a set of trading rules.  
Two of the most documented anomalies in equity markets are the day of the week effect (also known as Monday 
effect) and turn of the year effect (known as the January effect). The Monday effect occurs when returns are 
lower, or negative, on Monday in comparison with returns on other days of the week. The January effect is 
another common anomaly that is inconsistent with the EMH. This calendar effect happens when certain stocks 
generate higher returns in January compared to other months of the year. 
One aim of this study is to specifically test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions (as 
measured by the aggregate insider number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to 
trade on any particular day of the week or month of the year? The literature in this paper attempts to simply 
identify whether these anomalies exist and/or to try to explain their existence. For example, Cross (1973) and 
French (1980) reported negative returns on Monday. This may be due to the methodology employed or the way 
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of calculating returns (Connolly, 1989), investor psychology (Rystrom & Benson, 1989), the difference in 
trading patterns of individual and institutional investors (Lakonishok & Maberly, 1990), or settlement procedures 
(Keef & McGuinness, 2001).  
The day of the week anomalies in trading volume has also been examined by Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) 
and Sias and Starks (1995) with the aim of explaining calendar anomalies in stock returns. These studies 
suggested that Monday trading volume is higher compared to other days of the week. More specifically, there are 
more tendencies to sell on Mondays than to buy for individual investors or more tendencies to buy than to sell 
for institutional investors (Lakonishok & Maberly, 1990). The reason for this anomaly, as given by these studies, 
is related to the private information hypothesis and the behaviour of individual and institutional investors. To the 
best of our knowledge, no examination of the day of the week effects in aggregate insider activities as measured 
by the aggregate number of directors‟ trades has yet been carried out.  
Similarly, studies by Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Keim (1983) and Gu (2003) documented positive returns on 
January. The existence of this anomaly can be explained by a tax loss selling hypothesis (Fountas and Segredakis, 
2002), window dressing hypothesis (Haugen & Lakonishok, 1987), new information provided by the firms at the 
end of the financial year (Barry & Brown, 1984), or insider trading activities (Seyhun, 1988b, and Hillier & 
Marshall, 2002a).  
Trading volume anomalies in aggregate insider activities was also examined by Seyhun (1988b) and Hillier and 
Marshall (2002a). Seyhun (1988b) examined the monthly pattern of aggregate insider transactions in the US over 
the period 1975-1981with the aim of testing two competing explanations of the January effect the price pressure 
hypothesis (This hypothesis states that the large positive return at the turn of the year arises due to price pressure 
from predictable: seasonal changes in the demand for different securities) and the risk premium hypothesis (This 
hypothesis states that the large positive returns in January observed among small firms compensate for the 
increased risk of trading against informed traders). The results indicated that some insiders tend to accelerate 
their planned stock purchases and postpone their stock sales in December. Therefore, this enables insiders to 
capture a return that is more positive in January. Also, using aggregate insider trading, Hillier and Marshall 
(2002a) examined the January effect in UK securities and found that it was significant, but not persistent through 
time. Furthermore, the results showed that the seasonality in insider trading was not the main determinant of the 
turn of the year effect. Both of these studies used the aggregate number of insider trades as their measure of 
insider trading activity. Hillier and Marshall (2002a) used only six years insider trading data. We re-examined 
this in the UK by using a much longer time period (20 years), which may allow us to test for the persistence of 
this effect. Furthermore, we introduced another measure of insider trading activities, namely, the aggregate value 
of directors‟ trades. To the best of our knowledge, the day of the week effect in aggregate insider trading activity 
has not been examined yet.  
A second aim of this paper, given that such seasonal patterns exist, is to attempt to relate these patterns to 
explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies (in returns and volumes).  
Although the purpose of this paper is purely to identify whether such anomalies exist, we do not attempt to 
explain why they do. We suggest this is an avenue for further research in this area.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies on stock market anomalies and the 
explanations provided for both daily and monthly patterns in these anomalies. Section 3 sets the hypotheses. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the data and methodology. Section 6 discusses the results while Section 7 presents the 
conclusions. 
2. Background 
This section reviews the literature which identifies whether calender anomalies on returns (and volumes) exist 
and/or tries to explain their existence. More specifically, Section 2.1 reviews the literature which identify 
whether day of the week anomalies exist and/or tries to explain their existence, whereas Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature which identifies whether month of the year anomalies exist and/or tries to explain their existence. 
Section 2.3 reviews the existence literature of calendar anomalies in trading volume which aims of explaining 
stock returns anomalies. This literature will help us, later, setting our hypotheses in Section 3. 
2.1 Day of the Week Effects in Returns 
The day of the week anomaly (known as Monday effect) refers to the tendency of stocks to exhibit relatively 
negative returns on Mondays compared to other days of the week. This section reviews the studies which 
identified the existence of the day of the week anomalies and/or studies which try to explain their existence.  
When examining US markets, Cross (1973), French (1980), Gibbons and Hess (1981), Keim and Stambaugh 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 9; 2015 
61 
(1984), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), Bessembinder and Hertzel (1993) and Siegel (1998) reported significantly 
negative mean return on Mondays and high mean returns at the end of the week (Friday). 
Using data collected from the US, Canada, and the UK stock markets, Jaffe and Westerfield (1985 a, b) reported 
negative  returns on Mondays, whereas the data collected from Japanese and Australian stock markets showed 
negative returns on Tuesdays. In Paris Stock Exchange, Solnik and Bousquer (1990) reported similar strong and 
negative returns on Tuesday. Agrawal and Tandon (1994) examined the seasonality patterns in stock returns 
considering eighteen countries other than the US such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK and found lower (or negative) mean returns on Mondays and Tuesdays and higher (and 
positive) returns from Wednesdays to Fridays in almost all of these countries. Additionally, Arsad and Coutts 
(1997), Mehdian and Perry (2001), and Gregoriou, Kontonikas and Tsitsianis, (2004) examined the day of the 
week effect in the UK and found negative Monday returns.  
Also, when examining emerging markets, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989) and Wong et al. (1992) noticed lower 
mean stock returns on Mondays and Tuesdays in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Balaban (1995, 1996) and Dicle and Hassan (2007) found that the lowest, and negative, mean returns were on 
Tuesdays, and the highest returns and the lowest standard deviations were on Fridays in Turkish stock market. 
Martikainen and Puttonen (1996) reported negative and statistically significant average return on Tuesdays and 
Wednesdays in Finnish stock market. This pattern was repeated in studies by Elango and Al Macki (2008) and 
Hussain et al. (2011) for Indian Stock Exchange, whereas Ajayi et al. (2004) analysed the calendar behaviour of 
Vietnamese, Estonia and Lithuania stock market respectively and confirmed the same pattern (i.e. negative 
average returns on Tuesday).  
These studies, however, contradicted the presence of Day of the Week anomalies in stock market returns.  
Another strand of literature tried to explain these seasonal patterns by examining various hypotheses such as 
calendar time hypothesis, trading time hypothesis, and time zone hypothesis. According to calendar time 
hypothesis, Monday‟s average return is three times higher than other days‟ average returns. This is because 
Monday‟s average return is estimated from the closing price on Friday until the closing price on Monday. 
(French, 1980). On the other hand, Trading Time Hypothesis states that all days average return (Monday through 
Friday) should be the same because each day‟s return represents one day‟s investment (Draper & Paudyal) 
whereas Time Zone Hypothesis states that Tuesday‟s effect is due to time difference between US market and 
other markets (Jaffe & Westerfield, 1985; and Condoyanni, O‟Hanlon, & Ward, 1987).  
Other studies (e.g., Connolly, 1989; Sullivan, Timmerman, and White 2001; Hansen, Lunde and Nason, 2005) 
assumed that the day of the week effect might be a result of used methodology of estimation and testing. 
Investor‟s psychology is, as well, viewed as a cause of Day of the Week anomalies (Rystrom & Benson, 1989). 
Specifically, investors would be more likely to sell (buy) more stocks on Monday (Friday) if they felt pessimistic 
(optimistic) and, therefore, create downward (upward ) pressure in prices. Similarly, Nath and Dalvi (2004) 
suggested that investors avoid trading against informed traders on Mondays who might have more information 
received during the weekend. Thus, investors would likely to buy less on Monday.  
Based on these priors, one aim of this paper is to examine the presence of Day of the Week effect in insider 
trading activities as measured by aggregate number and value of insiders‟ trades. 
2.2 Month of the Year Effects in Returns 
The month-of-the-year effect is a calendar anomaly according to which stock returns show a rise or fall during 
certain months as compared to the mean. These seasonal effects are modelled using time series data and tend to 
be repeated every calendar year. Month of the year is also called January effect; this is particularly due to the 
tendency of stocks to perform better in January compared to any other time of the year (Rozeff & Kenney, 1976). 
This section reviews the studies which identified the existence of the month of the year anomaly and/or studies 
which try to explain their existence.  
Using different US indices, Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and Mehdian and Perry 
(2002) found that the mean January return is higher than mean return of other months. Similarly, but using UK 
data, Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), Arsad and Coutts (1997) and Hillier and Marshall (2002a) showed 
significantly positive returns in January for the entire period under examination and positive returns also in the 
months of April and December.  
January effect is also conducted by Choudhry (2001) and Gu (2003) using data from the pre-World War I era for 
the US, UK, and Germany, Canada, France, and Japan.  
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Empirical literature on stock return anomalies provided many explanations to the turn of the year effect (the 
January effect). Among these explanations are tax loss selling, capital gains taxation, and new information 
release hypotheses.  
Tax loss selling hypothesis is the most frequent explanation to the turn of the year anomalies. According to this 
hypothesis, investors, in order to avoid taxes on capital gains, realise capital losses to offset capital gains by 
selling losers stocks in December. This would cause high selling pressure in December which is relieved in 
January bringing about large capital gains for losers (Fountas & Segredakis, 2002; and Chen & Singal, 2004).  
Another related explanation is called capital gains taxation hypothesis. This hypothesis states that if investors 
realise capital losses to offset capital gains, it is also possible to delay capital gains realisation, so that they can 
delay tax payment on capital gains. By doing so, investors might postpone tax payment by one year. Thus, 
investors would sell winners (shares) in January. Hence, the selling pressure in December would be small 
causing the price to rise.  
Both of these hypotheses are based on tax purposes .i.e. investors, in order to avoid taxation, sell more in 
December or delay selling to January causing an increase in January returns.  
Studies by Roll (1983), Reiganum (1983) and Brown et al. (1983) suggested that tax loss selling hypothesis is 
the main driver of high January returns. These studies focused on small firms where price variation is high 
compared to other firm sizes (medium or large).  
Additional evidence for the tax-loss hypothesis in countries such as UK and Australia with a tax year-end other 
than the end of December has been also provided by many studies. For example, Brown, Kleidon and Marsh, 
(1983) reported July effect in Australia following a June tax year end. Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), Arsad and 
Coutts (1997), Draper and Paudyal (1997), and Baker and Limmack (1998) reported April effect in UK 
following 5th of April tax year end for individuals. These studies concluded that January (and April) anomaly 
may be due in part to a tax-loss-selling hypothesis.  
Constantinides (1984) and Chen and Singal (2004) suggested that rational investors should realise long-term 
capital gains to re-establish a short-term status to make short-term capital losses in the future. Moreover, 
investors should sell losers in December to realise capital losses and sell winners in December to re-establish a 
short-term status. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) provided another explanation to January anomalies, which is the 
information release hypothesis. This hypothesis states that January effect is caused by the information released 
by the company at the end of the financial year. The release of information in 1st of January creates and then 
resolves uncertainty and lead to (temporary) risk. Penman (1987) hypothesised that firms release good news in 
the beginning of each quarter and delay the releasing of bad news until the second half of the quarter. Thus, if the 
market reacts automatically to the news, stocks should earn higher returns in the first few days of each quarter. 
Also, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) suggested that stocks with high information suffer less compared to 
stocks with poor information. That is to say, if the information hypothesis is true, the January effect should relate 
negatively to the number of analysts forecasts. Hence, the smaller the number of analysts‟ forecasts, the greater 
the January returns.  
Based on these priors, another aim of this paper is to examine the presence of Month of the Year effect in insider 
trading activities as measured by aggregate number and value of insiders‟ trades. 
2.3 Calendar Anomalies in Trading Volume 
The purpose of this section is to review the literature on calendar anomalies in trading volume in order to provide 
a rationale to our research. Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) provided another reason for the negative Monday 
returns. They argued that the difference in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors (This study 
differentiates between institutional and individual investors based on trade size. Moreover, large stocks are 
mostly be held by institutional investors, whereas small stocks are likely to be held by individual investors) is 
one of the driving forces behind the negative Monday returns. They documented low trading volume on Monday 
for institutional investors and the opposite pattern for individual investors (.i.e. high trading volume on Monday).  
For buy and sell transactions, the increase in individuals activity on Mondays is not symmetric. Hence, 
individuals tend to sell more than to buy on Monday which, partially, might explain weekend effect. Osborne 
(1962) predicted that, individual investors spend more time on financial decisions during the weekend, whereas 
institutional investors are less active in the market on Monday because Monday tends to be a day of strategic 
planning. Therefore, individual investors are relatively more active in the market on Monday. Another reason 
why individual investors tend to sell more at the beginning of the week than to buy is that individual investors 
might decide to not engages in a buy transaction before his or her sell transactions are executed. Similarly, 
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Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) studied the trading patterns of individual investors and supported the results of 
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) that individual investors tend to sell more on Mondays. Based on the hypothesis 
that private information is received throughout the week while public information is received only on working 
days, informed trader might have more information on Monday than on other days of the week (Sias and Starks, 
1995). Hence, more informed trading would occur on Monday than on other days of the week leading liquidity 
trades to avoid Mondays. 
Furthermore, without public information, informed traders carry information from Monday to other days, so that 
price sensitivity is the same each day (to the order flow). The presence of public information reduces the effects 
of private information. Thus, more information is released through trading early in the week (Monday) because 
price sensitivity to the order flow would be low. In the presence of liquidity traders, the concentration of the 
trading is going to be on two days each week (Monday and Friday). This is the case when there are high public 
information signals. When public information signals are poor, liquidity traders would concentrate their trading 
on Friday. In this case, the trading volume by liquidity and informed traders might form a U-Shape. The U-Shape 
in intraday and interday trading volume patterns was previously found by Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Jain 
and Joh (1986), and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). These studies showed high trading volume on Monday and 
Friday (Foster & Viswanathan, 1990) and in the first and the last hours of the trading day (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
1988). Similarly, Blau, Van Ness and Van Ness, (2009) documented that the U-shaped pattern in intraday returns 
is caused by large trades because changeling in prices from larger (smaller) trades are higher (lower) at the 
beginning and end of the day. This is attributed to the fact that smaller trades, in periods of low volume, would 
move prices because informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the market. When volume is 
high, informed traders are able to increase the size of their trades because their information would be hidden by 
high volume. 
Badhani (2006) analysed the intraweek trading patterns of Foreign Institutional Investors in India and found low 
buying and selling volumes on Tuesdays. This Tuesday-effect may be a reflection of Monday-effect on 
institutional investors trading activities documented in US.  
Turning to monthly anomalies, the window dressing hypothesis offers another explanation of the January effect. 
According to this hypothesis which is developed by Haugen and Lakonishok (1987) and Lakonishok et al. 
(1991), institutional managers‟ performance and investment philosophy are used to evaluate them. To improve 
their performance, the institutions buy both risky and small stocks but sell them before the year ends. Therefore, 
their year-end holdings will not show these stocks. In January, investment managers replace winners, large, and 
low risk stocks with losers, small and risky stocks. 
Musto (1997) examined the window-dressing among money market instruments and found a January effect 
among those instruments that do not generate capital losses. He concluded that window-dressing activities of the 
institutional investors could explain the January effect at least partially. Similarly, Ritter and Chopra (1989) and 
Meier and Schaumburg (2004) provided supporting evidence for the window-dressing hypothesis. On the other 
hand, Sias and Starks (1997) evaluated the tax-loss-selling and the window-dressing hypotheses by looking at 
transaction data for stocks dominated by institutional investors versus those dominated by individual investors. 
Although they found that institutions tend to buy recent winners, which is consistent with the window-dressing 
hypothesis, they did not find any evidence of institutions selling losers, and their data did not show whether the 
winner buying institutions have year-end disclosures. Chen and Singal (2004) found no evidence for the 
window-dressing hypothesis by examining the stocks‟ return and volume patterns at the end of the semi-annual 
period (June-July) when tax-loss-selling is not expected.  
Lower volume of sales tends to be associated with losers (stocks, the prices of which have decreased) on 
December because investors, by postponing their sales by a month or two, postpone payments of capital tax by a 
full year. On the other side, the volume of sales for winners stocks tends to be higher on December because 
investors would apply these losses against their taxable incomes soon as possible (Dyl, 1977; and Henderson, 
1990). Lakonishock and Smidt (1986) assumed that there is a positive correlation between price and trading 
volume. Moreover, if the trading volume is affected by the degree of attention the company received, thus 
companies with large increase (decrease) in price might experience increase (decrease) in trading volume. Based 
on that, investors, who believe that price and trading volume are positively correlated, may be attracted by 
winners stocks and avoid losers ones. 
Seyhun (1988b) tried to relate January effects with insider trading activities by examining two competing 
hypotheses; price pressure and risk premium hypotheses. More specifically, the increase in insiders buying 
activities in December as a response to January‟s positive returns would enable insiders to capture price increase 
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in January. Hence, price pressure hypothesis assume insiders in small firms to be net buyers in December (the 
opposite pattern can be observed for insiders in large firms). On the other hand, risk premium hypothesis assume 
high buying or selling activities by insiders in january. However, the results showed that insiders buy more and 
delay selling shares in December to benefit from price running up in January. In contrast to the US studies, 
Hillier and Marshall (2002a) examined the January effect in the UK listed securities and found that it was 
significant but not persistent through the time. Moreover, the results showed that seasonalities in insider trading 
were not the main determinant of the turn of the year effect. 
2.4 Summary 
To summarise, previous empirical literature in stock returns anomalies supports the existence of the day of the 
week effect i.e. negative returns in the beginning of the week and high returns at the end of the week. These 
anomalies might be driven by the methodology employed or the way of calculating returns, investor psychology, 
the difference in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors, or settlement procedures. Also, the 
literature on trading volume suggests that Monday‟s trading volume is higher compared to other days of the 
week. More specifically, investors sell more on Monday if they are individual investors and sell less if they are 
institutional investors. This is perhaps due to the private information hypothesis and the behaviour of individual 
and institutional investors. Similarly, previous empirical literature in stock returns anomalies supports the 
existence of the month of the year effect i.e. high returns on January. These anomalies might be driven by the tax 
loss selling hypothesis, window dressing hypothesis, or new information provided by the firms at the end of the 
financial year. Also, the turn of the year effect might be due to director trading activities as measured by the 
aggregate number of directors‟ trades (Seyhun, 1988b, and Hillier & Marshall, 2002a).  
The first aim of this paper is to specially test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions (as 
measured by the aggregate insider number of trades and the aggregate value of insider transactions). Specifically, 
do insiders prefer to trade on any particular day of the week or month of the year? Secondly, given that such 
seasonal patterns exist, we are going to attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature 
on calendar anomalies in returns (and trading volume). 
3. Hypotheses 
The previous literature on the day of the week and month of the year anomalies in stock returns has attempted to 
identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to explain their existence. We examine the existence of the 
day of the week and month of the year anomalies in aggregate director trading activities as measured by the 
aggregate number and value of insider transactions. We commence by examining whether insiders have more 
preference for trading in any particular day of the week. In other words, we test the following hypothesis; 
Hypothesis (1): There is no day of the week effect in aggregate insider activities as measured by the aggregate 
number and value of directors’ trades  
Sias and Starks (1995) suggested that more informed investors tend to trade on Mondays than other days of the 
week because private information is available all days of the week including weekends while public information 
are only available on working days. Given that insider trading literature is ambiguous and suggests that informed 
trades are likely to be buy trades, we might expect; 
Hypothesis (2): The aggregate volume of directors’ buy (sell) trades is higher (lower) on Monday than on other 
days of the week.  
Focusing on the turn of the month, we first examine simple whether directors have preferences to trade at any 
particular month of the year. Therefore;  
Hypothesis (3): There is no month of the year effect in aggregate insider activities as measured by the aggregate 
number and value of directors’ trades  
In the UK, the tax year for the firms corresponds to the calendar year, whereas the tax year for the individuals 
ends at 5th of April. The tax loss selling literature, which is often used as an explanation for the turn of the year 
anomaly, suggests that firms and individuals sell more in the month before the end of the year and buy more after 
(Seyhun, 1988b; Hillier & Marshal, 2002a; and Chen, Jack, & Woods, 2007). Tax loss selling hypothesis states 
that investors sell stocks that have declined in value in December/March (one month before the taxation date) to 
realise capital loss and offset it against capital gain tax. In January, the stocks that have been sold would recover 
resulting high returns in January/April. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis (4): Directors tend to sell more in March and buy more in April compared to other months of the year 
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4. Data 
This study is based on data collected between January 1991 and December 2010 by two different data sources,  
1) Directus Ltd compiled a complete record of director‟s trades in the United Kingdom (1991-2001).  
2) Directors Deals, which monitors and analyses share transactions made by directors in their own companies 
(sometimes known as Insider Deals).  
The original dataset provides information on various transaction types, but we removed trades other than open 
market purchases and sales of ordinary shares by directors. We removed trades such as option exercise, 
derivative, script dividends or bonus shares, rights issue, awards made to directors under Incentive plans or 
reinvestment plans, gifts, transfers and purchase, and sales of shares under personal equity plans, operations 
derived from tax or “bed & breakfast”. Open market sales and purchases are more likely to represent actions 
taken because of special insider information (Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et al., 1994; and Friederich et al., 2002).  
This period yields a sample of 91,970 trades for every publicly disclosed transaction by UK directors in their 
own firms. 
5. Methods 
This study uses daily values (and numbers) of directors‟ trades from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2010. Using 
daily data allows us to examine the relationship between the changes of trades‟ value (number of trades) from 
one trading day to the other. In order to avoid possible bias of missing information due to public holidays, five 
observations per week were used. 
The linear regression model and the ordinary least squares-method (OLS) were employed. Brooks (2014) 
suggested several assumptions for the classical linear regression model. They included for example 
homoscedasticity of the residuals and zero autocorrelation among residuals. We decided to use the OLS method 
because it has been used largely in anomalies testing. For example, Gibbons and Hess (1981) and Ajayi, 
Mehdian and Perry (2004) used this method while Brooks (2014) suggested that this is the basic method for 
studying calendar anomalies. 
Classical assumptions are necessary for the OLS to be the best linear estimation method for the regression 
model.  
Our sample contains transactions whose values are more than £15 million and transactions whose values are £1 
or less. These transactions might (or might not) have an impact on our results. Thus, to examine whether these 
observations have an influence on regression estimates, we run the OLS regression and test for the 
heteroscedacity of residuals. 
Formally, we used the following regression model: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦  + 𝛽𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 +
𝛽𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑒𝑡                                (1) 
Valuet = insider aggregate value on day t; 
DTuesday= dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Tuesday and 0 otherwise, 
DWednesday = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Wednesday and 0 otherwise, 
DThursday = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Thursday and 0 otherwise, 
DFriday = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Friday and 0 otherwise, 
et= Error term. 
Table 1 shows the results of the regression models of whether aggregate value of directors‟ trades as a whole 
(buy and sell combined) varies across days of the week. The results indicate high average value for directors‟ 
trades as well as a significant t-statistics. When testing for heteroscedacity, the results show that the variance is 
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Table 1. Day of the week effects: the results of the dummy variable regression of directors‟ trades (buys and sales 
combined) 
value Coefficients Standard Errors t-statistics 
Monday 6,310,110 1,233,764 5.11 
Tuesday 7,064,410 1,179,178 5.99 
Wednesday 4,707,077 1,173,995 4.01 
Thursday 5,271,727 1,172,853 4.49 
Friday 5,695,275 1,189,754 4.79 
Heteroscedacity Test  0.000 
 
Diagrammatically, Figure 1 shows the distribution of directors‟ aggregate value of trade across days of the week. 




Figure 1. The distribution of insiders‟ aggregate value across days of the week 
 
Figure 2 plots regression residuals against regression leverage. Leverage is a measure of how far an independent 
variable deviates from its mean. This figure shows that some observations have high residuals, some 
observations have high leverage and some of them have the both. For example, there are many trades on Tuesday 
which have high residuals and high leverage (see the upper right observation). Another example is an 
observation on the bottom right with high residual, but low leverage. 
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Therefore, to avoid the bias that might occur because of these transactions, we are going to:  
1) Re-run the OLS model by using the logarithm value instead of the total value (as a dependent variable) to 
reduce the effects of these transactions on our results. This method was previously used by Nghiem et al., 
(2012). 
2) Re-run the OLS model after excluding transactions whose values are more than £15 million. In this case, 
the total value of directors‟ trades is the dependent variable; and  
Re-run a TOBIT regression model which is a censored form of OLS model normally used when the sample is 
biased to the left or to the right. This model would automatically eliminate the values that might cause biases to 
the results (In the cases where the values are not biased to the left or to the right, the results are similar to 
those calculated using OLS model). This step is similar to the previous one except that it would exclude 
transactions with small values. Thus, the results for the last two methods, sometimes, might be the same or might 
have small differences. Sometimes TOBIT Regression Model is considered as a Robust Regression Model to 
control for Heteroscedacity and normality problems.   
However, the methodology used in this paper is to test whether there is a day of the week or month of the year 
anomalies in aggregate directors‟ trades as measured by the aggregate value (and number) of insider transactions 
[hypotheses (1) and (3)], whether directors‟ buy volume on Monday is higher compared to other days of the 
week [hypothesis (2)] and whether directors sell more in March and December [hypothesis (4)] by estimating the 
following regression models: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦  + 𝛽𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 
𝛽𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑒𝑡                                  (2) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡= 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦  + 
𝛽𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑒𝑡                        (3) 
Where, 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 = the logarithm of insider aggregate value (or the total value of directors‟ trades) on day t; 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 = Insider aggregate number of trades on day t; 
To test the linear combination of coefficients of the OLS model, we conducted an F-test. The null hypothesis is 
that all the coefficients in the regression model are the same against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of 
the coefficients is not equal.  
𝐻0 ∶  𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦  
Similarly, to test the monthly patterns, we construct almost an identical model. This model has been used by, for 
instance, Mehdian and Perry (2001). Therefore, we employ the following regression: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ  + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  
+𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝑒𝑡                                (4) 
𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ  + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 
𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝑒𝑡                                (5) 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 is the logarithm of the aggregate value of directors‟ trades (or the total value of directors‟ trades). 
𝐷𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 through 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 are dummy variables for each month of the year, such that 𝐷𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 takes a value 
of 1 for all January observations and zero otherwise, and so on. et is the disturbance term. Again, we can 
consider our null hypothesis as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 = 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 = 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = ⋯ = 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  
Our purpose here is to examine whether the aggregate value (and number) of directors‟ trades is statistically 
different on a particular month compared to other months of the year. The alternative to the null hypothesis 
would indicate statistically significant monthly seasonality. 
Similar to previous studies in colander anomalies such as Lim et al. (2010) and Khan et al. (2013), we used 
Kruskal–Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks, which is a non-parametric method To test equality of 
means across groups and Kruskal–Wallis test assumes that the residuals are not necessary to be normally 
distributed.   
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The Kruskal Wallis test statistic is: 








𝑖=1 − 3 (𝑛 + 1)                             (6) 
Where R is the sum of the ranks for group i.  
The null hypothesis is that the average values (numbers) of directors‟ trades across all the trading days are equal. 
If the Kruskal-Wallis statistic is less than the critical chi value, it implies that the null hypothesis should not be 
rejected, and that average values (number) of directors‟ trades across the week-days are not significantly 
different from each other. 
6. Results 
This section reports the empirical results of the study. First, summary statistics is resented to highlight the trends 
and patterns of UK directors‟ trades. Second, we test the hypotheses whether directors‟ aggregate value (and 
number) of trades are significantly different across days of the week or months of the year using the dummy 
variable regression and K-W statistic test, which was discussed earlier in the methodology section. 
6.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics categorised by transaction type (buys and sales only) during the sample 
period. The sample includes 91,970 trades divided into 69,967 buy trades and 22,003 sale ones over the period 
1991 to 2010, with a total monetary value of £28.9 billion. There are approximately three times as many buy 
trades as sells. Although buy trades are more frequent than sell trades, the average value of sell trades is 
approximately seven times larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently but in larger monetary 
amounts (a similar argument can be said to volume). The average value of directors‟ purchases was £122,184, 
but the average value of sales was £928,788, so directors‟ sales are fewer in number but much larger in value. 
The last column of Table 2 shows the number of days during the period in which at least one buy (sell) takes 
place. There are approximately 4,979 event dates (99.5% of sample days) for buy trades and 4,583 event dates 
(91.6% of sample days) for sell trades. During our sample period, there are trades of on average of thirteen buy 
trades (five sell trades) per event date. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics categorised by transaction type 1991-2010 
Type No of Trades Total Value (£) Total Volume Avg Value £ Avg Volume No of Days 
BUY 69,967 8,548,845,389 8,615,507,651 122,184 123,137 4979 
SELL 22,003 20,436,128,362 11,044,602,967 928,788 501,959 4583 
Total 91,970 28,984,973,750 19,660,110,618    
 
Average value of buy (sell) trades is the total value of buy (sell) trades divided by the total number of buy (sell) 
trades. Volume of buy (sell) trades presents the total number of shares that directors buy (sell). Average volume 
of buy (sell) trades the volume of buy (sell) trades divided by the total number of buy (sell) trades. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by both days and transaction type during the 
sample period. There are more buy trades than sell trades in all days. The majority of buys and sales occurred on 
Fridays. Buys and sales on Mondays are much less frequent. Although it is not shown in Table 3 directly, the 
number of buy trades by day is approximately three times the total number of sell trades per day. The average 
value (per day) of directors‟ buy transactions (and sell transactions) on Mondays (and Tuesday) is the highest 
whereas the average value (per trade) of directors‟ buy transactions (and sell transactions) on Mondays 
(Tuesdays) is the highest.  
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of daily directors‟ buys and sells over the period 1991-2010 
Days  Directors‟ Buy Trades Directors‟ Sell Trades 
 No of Trades Avg Value/Day (£) Avg Value/Trade (£) No of Trades Avg Value/Day (£) Avg Value/Trade (£) 
Monday 12,750 3,086,676 223,693 4,091 3,524,595 735,762 
Tuesday 13,715 2,192,718 161,956 4,327 5,406,626 1,147,049 
Wednesday 14,274 878,470 62,774 4,555 4,180,045 863,539 
Thursday 14,508 935,616 66,037 4,397 4,720,915 1,014,616 
Friday 14,720 1,626,303 110,151 4,633 4,402,765 878,082 
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Average value per day is the total value of the trade (buy or sell) divided by the number of days. For example, 
the average value of buy trades on Mondays is equal to the total value of buy trades on that day divided by the 
number of Mondays in our sample. Average value per trade is equal to the total value of the trade (buy or sell) on 
a specific day divided by the number of trades on that day. The same thing can be said for the average volume 
per day and per trade.  
Table 4 reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by both months and transaction type during 
the sample period. There are more buy trades than sell trades in all months. The majority of buys and sales 
occurred in March. Buys and sales on February and August respectively are much less frequent.  
Although it is not shown directly in Table 3, the number of buy trades by month is approximately three times the 
total number of sell trades per month. The average value (per month) of directors‟ buy transactions (and sell 
transactions) in April (and June) is the highest whereas the average value (per trade) of directors‟ buy 
transactions (and sell transactions) on May (October) is the highest.  
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of monthly directors‟ buys and sells over the period 1991-2010 
Months No of Trades Avg Value/Month (£) Avg Value/Trade (£) 
 Directors‟ Buy Trades 
January 5,155 14,900,000 57,841 
February 4,099 21,900,000 106,757 
March 7,109 27,800,000 78,290 
April 6,003 72,500,000 241,460 
May 5,254 66,500,000 253,197 
June 6,345 20,700,000 65,392 
July 6,301 51,500,000 163,555 
August 4,659 49,100,000 210,744 
September 6,941 22,100,000 63,701 
October 6,437 17,000,000 52,673 
November 5,439 19,100,000 70,065 
December 6,225 44,400,000 142,508 
 Directors‟ Sell Trades  
January 1,676 47,600,000 568,458 
February 1,625 48,900,000 602,434 
March 2,907 114,000,000 781,381 
April 2,911 74,900,000 514,875 
May 1,841 66,100,000 717,934 
June 1,974 139,000,000 1,411,424 
July 1,508 93,300,000 1,237,655 
August 1,198 44,500,000 743,339 
September 1,796 106,000,000 1,179,106 
October 1,430 119,000,000 1,664,113 
November 1,415 88,200,000 1,246,490 
December 1,722 80,400,000 933,944 
 
Average value per month is the total value of the trade (buy or sell) divided by the number of months. For 
example, the average value of buy trades on January is equal to the total value of buy trades on that month 
divided by the number of January in our sample. Average value per trade is equal to the total value of the trade 
(buy or sell) on a specific month divided by the number of trades on that month. The same thing can be said for 
the average volume per day and per trade. 
6.2 Day of the Week Effect 
The previous literature on calendar anomalies has been on returns. This literature has attempted to simply 
identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to explain their existence. For example, Cross (1973), 
French (1980), Arsad and Coutts (1997), and Gregoriou, Kontonikas and Tsitsianis (2004) reported negative 
returns on Monday, whereas Solnik and Bousquer (1990) indicated strong and negative returns on Tuesday. Also, 
studies such as Agrawal and Tandon (1994) and Balaban (1995, 1996) reported positive returns on Friday. These 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 9; 2015 
70 
anomalies are perhaps due to the methodology employed or the way of calculating returns, investor psychology, 
the difference in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors, or settlement procedures.  
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and Sias and Starks (1995) found low trading 
volume on Monday for institutional investors and the opposite pattern for individual investors (i.e. high trading 
volume on Monday). They reasoned that individual investors have more time to devote to financial decisions 
during the weekend, whereas institutional investors are less active in the market on Monday because Monday 
tends to be a day of strategic planning. Also, Sias and Starks (1995) found that informed investors tend to trade 
more on Mondays because private information is available all days of the week including weekends.  
Based on these priors, this section examines the seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions (as 
measured by the aggregate insider number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to 
trade on any particular day of the week [hypothesis (1) and hypothesis (2)]? Given that such seasonal patterns 
exist, we attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies.  
We use the regression model discussed earlier in the methodology section (Equations 2, and 3) where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm value (or the total value of directors‟ trades) and the aggregate number of 
directors‟ trades, whilst the independent variables are dummy variables which present days of the week. 
Beside examining the day effects on directors‟ trades as a whole, we deliberately chose to split our sample into 
directors‟ buys and sells in order to examine hypothesis (2) which indicates that trading volume of directors‟ 
buys on Mondays are higher relative to other days of the week.  
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show the results of the different regressions on the aggregate value (and number) of directors‟ 
trades during the sample period. More specifically, Table 5 shows the results of the regression models of whether 
aggregate value (and number) of directors‟ trades as a whole (buy and sell combined) varies across days of the 
week, Table 6 shows the results of the regression models of whether aggregate value (and number) of directors‟ 
buys varies across days of the week, and Table 7 shows the results of the regression models of whether aggregate 
value (number) of directors‟ sells varies across days of the week.  
One clear pattern emerges from Table 4 where, for the period 1991-2010, director trading value is the lowest on 
Tuesday relative to other days of the week. The null hypothesis that director trading value is the same across all 
days of the week can be rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, director trading value 
appears to be slightly higher on Friday. A comparison of Tuesday versus other days indicates a tendency for 
Tuesday to become less active. Excluding Tuesday, the null hypothesis that the trading value is the same can be 
accepted. These results are repeated after excluding trades with more than £15 million and also after using 
TOBIT Model. Moreover, the average value of Tuesday trades is £2.52 which is approximately 15% less than the 
average value of Friday and Monday trades.  
Similarly, Tuesday‟s (Friday‟s) average number of directors‟ trades is the lowest (the highest) relative to the other 
remaining four days. The results of the F-test confirm the latter. These results support Hypothesis (1), which 
states that there is no difference in aggregate director trading activities as measured by the aggregate number and 
value of directors‟ trades across days of the week. The results show that Tuesday‟s number of trades (and value) 
is less frequent, whereas Friday‟s number of trades (and value) is more frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (1) 
is rejected for director aggregate value and number of directors‟ trades. Another pattern emerges from the results 
of OLS after excluding large trades, and from the TOBIT regression model; the pattern is that the distribution of 
the average value of directors‟ trades across the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the 
beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). 
The results of OLS Model excluding trades whose values are more than £15 million are similar to those obtained 
using TOBIT Model except for Friday. This is because TOBIT Regression Model excludes small trades in 
addition to the large ones. The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the 
coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero.  
The F-test, for example, for testing the hypothesis whether the coefficients are jointly different from zero is 2.96 
(0.0187) for the first regression. The Heteroscedacity test shows that the variance is constant.   
To summarise, there seems to be a day of the week anomaly in aggregate insider transactions as measured by the 
aggregate value and number of insider transactions. More specifically, lower Tuesday and higher Friday trades. 
Therefore, insiders have a preference to trade more on Friday and less on Tuesday. The aggregate value of 
director transactions, which is higher on Friday and lower on Tuesday, is consistent with the previous studies 
such as Agrawal and Tandon (1994) and Balaban (1995, 1996) which reported positive returns on Friday and 
negative returns on Tuesdays.  
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Table 5. Day of the week effects: the results of the dummy variable regression of directors‟ trades (buys and sales 
combined) 
Day OLS Model (log 
Values) 
OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of trades 




t-test Coefficient. t-test 
Monday 14.08 277.41 3.002 21.51 3.003 22.21 18.13 49.98 
Tuesday 13.99 288.39 2.527 18.94 2.527 18.94 17.74 51.17 
Wednesday 14.10 292.13 2.700 20.33 2.700 20.33 18.35 53.17 
Thursday 14.12 292.67 2.934 22.11 2.934 22.11 18.39 53.33 
Friday 14.22 290.59 3.039 22.57 3.036 22.55 19.37 55.38 











2.96 2.65 2.65 2.98 
(F-test) 0.0187 0.0313 0.0313 0.018 
 
Previous studies on trading volume anomalies found that informed investors tend to trade more on Mondays 
because private information is available all days of the week including weekends, whereas other studies indicates 
Tuesday effect in trading volume in other markets rather than US and reasoned that as a reflection of trades by 
informed investors on Monday. On the other side, studies by lakonishok and Maberly (1990) and Abraham and 
Ikenberry (1994) suggested that individual investors sell more (buy less) on Monday because they have more 
time to think about their decisions during the weekends. Our results find Friday and Tuesday effects in average 
number of directors‟ trades which reflects the desire for insiders to trade more on Friday and less on Tuesday. 
One possible explanation, based on the previous studies, is that insiders act like institutional investors who trade 
less on Tuesday as a reflection of insiders‟ trades on Monday in US. Also, bearing in mind that the aim of the 
previous studies in trading volume anomalies is to explain the calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results 
were consistent with studies on stock returns anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on 
Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock returns.  
The U shape pattern (in average value of directors‟ trades) observed when running OLS (excluding trades over 
£15 million) and TOBIT model can be attributed to price changes from larger(smaller) trades which are higher 
(lower) at the beginning and end of the day. In our case, to price changes from larger (smaller) trades are higher 
(lower) in the beginning and at the end of week. This is attributed to the view that smaller trades would move 
prices during periods of low volume because informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the 
market. When volume is low, informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume hides 
their information (Blau et al., 2012). 
6.2.1 Directors‟ Buys 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression models on daily aggregate value (number) of directors‟ buys during 
the sample period. One clear pattern emerges from Table 5 is that the coefficient of Friday is higher than the 
coefficients of other days of the week, whereas the coefficient of Tuesday is the lowest compared to other days‟ 
coefficients. The null hypothesis that the director trading value is the same across all days of the week cannot be 
rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). Again, the results of OLS Model (after excluding outliers) 
and TOBIT Model confirm the previous findings that there is no day of the week anomaly in aggregate value of 
directors‟ buy transactions.  
Table 6 also shows that the average number of directors‟ trades is lowest on Tuesday relative to other days of the 
week. The null hypothesis that the average number of directors‟ trades is the same across all days of the week 
can be rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, the average number of directors‟ trades 
appears to be slightly higher on Friday. A comparison of Tuesday versus other days indicates a tendency for 
Tuesday to become less active and tendency for Friday to be more active.  
These results fail to support Hypothesis (1) since they indicate no day of the week effect in aggregate directors‟ 
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trading value. The results also show that Tuesday‟s number of trades is less frequent, whereas Friday‟s number of 
trades is more frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (1) is rejected for director aggregate number of directors‟ 
trades, but it isaccepted for directors‟ aggregate value.  
Hypothesis (2) states that buy trading volume is higher on Monday compared to other days of the week. Our 
results show that Friday‟s average number of trades is higher (and Tuesday average number of trades is lower) 
compared to other days of the week. Hence, we rejected hypothesis (2). Thus, the buy trading volume on Friday 
is higher than other days of the week. Again, the distribution of the average value of directors‟ buy trades across 
the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the 
week (Friday). 
 
Table 6. Day of the week effects: the results of the dummy variable regression of directors‟ buys 
Day OLS Model  
(log Values) 
OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of trades 




t-test Coefficient. t-test 
Monday 12.66 240.83 0.824 17.99 0.819 17.83 13.72 43.98 
Tuesday 12.58 250.46 0.697 15.92 0.693 16.12 13.49 45.21 
Wednesday 12.64 252.78 0.731 16.76 0.725 16.59 13.91 46.85 
Thursday 12.65 253.06 0.770 17.68 0.767 17.55 14.11 47.57 
Friday 12.77 251.86 0.794 17.97 0.792 17.88 14.73 48.96 











1.69 1.28 1.31 2.36 
(F-test) 0.1484 0.2757 0.2649 0.0514 
 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero. 
To summarise, it looks like there is no day of the week anomaly in aggregate value of directors‟ trades. Also, the 
aggregate number of directors‟ trades is higher on Friday and lower on Tuesday which indicates the existence of 
the day of the week effect in insider aggregate number of trades. This reflects the desire of directors to trade 
more on Friday (and less on Tuesday). 
6.2.2 Directors‟ Sells 
Table 7 reports the results of the regression models on the aggregate value (number) of directors‟ sells during the 
sample period. One clear pattern emerges from Table 7 is that the coefficient of Friday is higher than the 
coefficients of other days of the week, whereas the coefficient of Tuesday is the lowest compared to other days‟ 
coefficients. The null hypothesis that the director trading value is the same across all days of the week cannot be 
rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). These results are again repeated after excluding trades 
with more than £15 and also after using TOBIT Model. Moreover, the average value of Tuesday sells is £1.55 
which is approximately 20% less than the average value of Friday and Monday trades.  
In the same vein, it appears that there is no day of the week effect in director trading selling activities as 
measured by the aggregate number of directors‟ sell trades. Back to Hypothesis (1), the results indicate no day of 
the week effect in aggregate directors‟ trading value and number. In other words, Hypothesis (1) is accepted for 
directors‟ aggregate value, number and volume. Given that there is no day of the week anomaly in director 
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OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of trades 
Coefficient t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient. t-test 
Monday 12.36 95.65 2.177 17.08 1.962 14.7 4.40 32.92 
Tuesday 12.14 98.36 1.830 15.02 1.559 11.89 4.25 33.28 
Wednesday 12.40 100.87 1.969 16.23 1.737 13.34 4.44 34.88 
Thursday 12.42 101.16 2.163 17.85 1.945 14.96 4.28 33.64 
Friday 12.59 101.08 2.244 18.25 2.042 15.5 4.64 35.95 











1.29 1.97 2.26 0.4 
(F-test) 0.2732 0.0964 0.0599 0.7563 
 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero. 
To summarise, the aggregate value (number) of sale trades does not vary across days of the week. Instead, we 
can say that directors‟ trades, in general, on Tuesdays and Wednesdays are the lowest relative to other days of the 
week. 
6.2.3 Summary of Day of the Week Anomalies Results 
To summarise, the results show that there is no day of the week effects in aggregate value of directors‟ buys and 
sells, but it looks like there is a Tuesday effect in aggregate value of directors „trades when buys and sells are 
combined together. An examination of the existence of Tuesday effects was previously conducted in stock 
returns (Agrawal & Tandon, 1994; Martikainen & Puttonen, 1996; and Brooks & Persand, 2001) and in trading 
volume (Badhani, 2006).  
The distribution of the average value of directors‟ trades (buys and sells) across the week days forms a U shape 
i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). The U shape 
pattern (in average value of directors‟ trades) is perhaps due to price changes from larger (smaller) trades which 
are higher (lower) at the beginning and end of the week. This is because smaller trades would move prices 
during periods of low volume because informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the market. 
When volume is low, informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume hides their 
information (Blau et al., 2012). 
Also, the aggregate number of directors‟ trades (buy and sell combined and buy transactions) is higher on Friday 
and lower on Tuesday which means that there is a day of the week effect in insider aggregate number of trades. 
One possible explanation, based on the previous studies, is that insiders act like institutional investors who trade 
less on Tuesday as a reflection of insiders‟ trades on Monday in US. Taking into accounts that the aim of the 
previous studies in trading volume anomalies was to explain the calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results 
were consistent with studies on stock returns anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on 
Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock returns. 
6.3 Results of Monthly Patterns 
This literature attempts to simply identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to explain their existence. 
For example, Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Keim (1983), Mehdian and Perry (2002) and Gu (2006) found positive 
returns in January. The existence of this anomaly can be explained by a tax loss selling hypothesis, window 
dressing hypothesis, new information provided by the firms at the end of the financial year, or insider trading 
activities.  
The volume of sales tends to be lower for losers stocks in December because investors, by postponing their sales 
by a month or two, postpone payments of capital tax by a full year, whereas the volume of sales for winners 
stocks in December because investors would apply these losses against their taxable incomes soon as possible 
(Dyl, 1977; Henderson, 1990).  
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Seyhun (1988b) examined the monthly pattern of aggregate insider transactions in the US over the period 
1975-1981, whereas Hillier and Marshall (2002) examined the January effect in UK securities. Both of these 
studies use the aggregate number of insider trades as their measure of insider trading activity, and both of these 
studies found that January returns are positive and significant. 
Based on these previous findings, this section examines the seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading 
transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, do 
insiders prefer to trade on any particular month of the year [hypothesis (3)]? Given that such seasonal patterns 
exist, we attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies in 
returns (and volumes). 
We use the regression model discussed earlier in the methodology section (Equations 4, and 5) where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm value (and volume) and the aggregate number of directors‟ trades, whilst the 
independent variables are dummy variables which represent months of the year. In addition to examining the 
monthly effects on directors‟ trades as a whole, we deliberately chose to split our sample into directors‟ buys and 
sells in order to examine hypothesis (4). 
6.3.1 Directors‟ Trades 
Table 8 presents the results of the different regression models on monthly aggregate value (number) of directors‟ 
activities during the sample period. 
One clear pattern emerges from Table 8 which indicates that, for the period 1991-2010, director trading value in 
March is the highest relative to other months of the year. The null hypothesis that director trading value is the 
same across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, 
director trading value appears to be slightly lower in February. A comparison of March versus other months 
indicates a tendency for March to become more active. The results of OLS Model (when excluding outliers) and 
the results of TOBIT Model show that March trading value is higher and significantly different from other 
months trading value. More specifically, the average value of directors‟ trades on March is £84 million which 
reflects the tendency for directors to trade more in March.  
Table 8 also shows that the average number of directors‟ trades in March is the highest relative to other months 
of the year. The average trading number on March is 500 transactions, versus an average of 450 transactions for 
April. This implies a decrease of more than ten per cent in trading number in April. March's trading number is 
significantly different from the trading number of the remaining months. The null hypothesis that the average 
number of directors‟ trades is the same across all months of the year can be rejected at the five per cent level 
(based on an F-test). 
Back to Hypothesis (3), which states that there is no month of the year effect in aggregate insider activities as 
measured by the aggregate number, value and volume of directors‟ trades, the results indicate no month of the 
year effect in aggregate directors‟ trading value when using logarithm value as a depended variable, but when 
excluding large trades and running TOBIT regression the results show March anomaly. The results also show 
that March‟s number of trades is higher.  
To summarise, the average number of directors‟ trades varies across months of the year. More specifically, 
March trades‟ number is higher and significantly different compared to other months of the year. These results 
are also confirmed for directors‟ aggregate value of trades when excluding trades with sterling value more than 
£15 million and when using the TOBIT regression model. Thus, directors prefer to trade more in March (either 
buy or sell).  
 
Table 8. Monthly effect: the results of the dummy variable regression on directors‟ trades 
 
Month 
OLS Model (logarithm 
Values) 
OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 17.63 77.79 44.600 5.14 43.597 5.14 341.55 9.5 
February 17.59 77.62 46.100 5.31 46.035 5.31 286.2 7.96 
March 18.30 80.74 84.100 9.69 84.140 9.69 500.8 13.93 
April 18.08 79.77 61.900 7.13 62.020 7.13 445.7 12.4 
May 18.15 80.08 65.500 7.55 65.315 7.55 354.75 9.87 
June 18.32 80.8 79.200 9.13 79.923 9.13 415.95 11.57 
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In UK, April is the month of taxation. According to the tax-loss hypothesis, investors sell more in the month 
before the taxation and buy more after taxation. Therefore, these results might be due to directors selling more to 
avoid taxes. More details are given in the next two sections when examining directors‟ buys and sells separately. 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero.    
6.3.2 Directors‟ Buys 
Table 9 reports the results of the OLS Model (with the usage of the logarithm of value as a dependent variable 
and after excluding the outliers) and the TOBIT Model on monthly aggregate value (and number) of Directors‟ 
buys during the sample period.  
One clear pattern emerges from Table 9 which indicates that, for the period 1991-2010, director trading value in 
December is the highest relative to other months of the year. The null hypothesis that director trading value is the 
same across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, 
director trading value appears to be slightly lower on February. A comparison of December versus other months 
indicates a tendency for December to become more active. These results are repeated (the non-existence of 
monthly anomalies) after excluding trades with more than £15 and also after using TOBIT Model. 
Table 9 also shows that the average number of directors‟ trades in March is the highest relative to other months 
of the year. The average trading number for March is 355 transactions, versus an average of 321 transactions for 
October. This implies a decrease of approximately ten per cent in trading number in October. March's trading 
number is significantly different from the trading number of the remaining months. The null hypothesis which 
assumes that the average number of directors‟ trades is the same across all months of the year can be rejected at 
the five percent level (based on an F-test).  
 
Table 9. Monthly effect: the results of the dummy variable regression on directors‟ buys 
July 17.95 79.17 53.300 6.14 53.510 6.14 390.45 10.86 
August 17.64 77.84 39.400 4.54 38.934 4.54 292.85 8.14 
September 18.17 80.15 67.000 7.72 66.900 7.72 436.85 12.15 
October 18.04 79.6 50.000 5.75 50.089 5.75 393.35 10.94 
November 17.99 79.38 54.200 6.24 54.090 6.24 342.7 9.53 















1.21 2.51 2.51 3.08 
(F-test) 0.2782 0.0054 0.0054 0.0007 
 
Month 
OLS Model (logarithm 
Values) 
OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 16.20 66.92 12.500 4.45 12.465 4.5 257.75 7.91 
February 16.09 66.48 10.100 3.59 10.025 3.62 204.95 6.29 
March 16.73 69.11 19.500 6.95 19.580 7.07 355.45 10.9 
April 16.39 67.73 13.600 4.85 13.670 4.93 300.15 9.21 
May 16.56 68.42 18.400 6.54 18.415 6.65 262.7 8.06 
June 16.46 67.99 19.700 7.03 19.987 7.2 317.25 9.73 
July 16.55 68.38 16.300 5.8 16.300 5.88 315.05 9.67 
August 16.13 66.63 10.700 3.81 10.269 3.68 232.95 7.15 
September 16.44 67.91 17.700 6.29 17.715 6.39 347.05 10.65 
October 16.29 67.3 17.000 6.04 17.049 6.14 321.85 9.87 
November 16.45 67.94 16.300 5.79 16.285 5.88 271.95 8.34 
December 16.85 69.61 18.900 6.72 18.920 6.83 311.25 9.55 
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Turning to Hypothesis (3), the results indicate no month of the year effect in aggregate directors‟ trading value. 
The results also show that March‟s number of trades is more frequent, whereas February‟s number of trades is 
less frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (3) is rejected for director aggregate number of trades, but it is accepted 
for directors‟ aggregate value.  
Also, Hypothesis (4), which suggests that Directors tend to sell more in March and buy more in April compared 
to other months of the year, is rejected. Thus, insiders have preferences to buy more in March. 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero.    
To summarise, there is no monthly anomalies in aggregate insider buying activities as measured by the aggregate 
value of insider transactions. For director trading number of trades, March‟s number of buy trades is higher, 
which suggests that directors are more likely to trade on March than on other months of the year. According to 
tax loss hypothesis, we expected to find high buy trades in April, but instead we found high buying activities in 
March. One possible explanation is that 5th of April is the taxation date for individuals in the UK; therefore, 
insiders might buy till the last two weeks of March. Hence, March effect in the aggregate number of directors‟ 
trades is perhaps due to buy activities in the first twenty days of March.  
6.3.3 Directors‟ Sells 
Table 10 reports the results of the OLS Model (with the usage of the logarithm value as dependent variable and 
after excluding the outliers), and the TOBIT Model on monthly aggregate value (and number) of directors‟ sells 
during the sample period.  
 
















0.90 1.44 1.58 1.97 
(F-test) (0.5435 0.1561 0.1067 0.0321 
Month OLS Model (logarithm 
Values) 
OLS Model (Total Values 
Excluding Outliers) 
TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 17.19 68.15 32.100 4.41 31.132 4.32 83.8 8.44 
February 17.25 68.39 36.000 4.94 36.010 5.02 81.25 8.19 
March 17.92 71.04 64.600 8.87 64.560 9.01 145.35 14.64 
April 17.77 70.45 48.300 6.63 48.350 6.74 145.55 14.66 
May 17.72 70.25 47.100 6.47 46.900 6.54 92.05 9.27 
June 18.04 71.52 59.500 8.17 59.936 8.35 98.7 9.94 
July 17.58 69.7 37.000 5.09 37.210 5.19 75.4 7.6 
August 17.13 67.91 28.700 3.94 28.665 4 59.9 6.04 
September 17.81 70.61 49.300 6.78 49.185 6.86 89.8 9.05 
October 17.62 69.86 33.000 4.53 33.040 4.61 71.5 7.2 
November 17.60 69.76 37.900 5.2 37.805 5.27 70.75 7.13 












= 𝜷𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉 = ⋯ .
= 𝜷𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 
1.28 1.63 2.46 7.53 
(F-test) 0.2350 0.0988 0.0063 0.000 
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One clear pattern emerges from Table 10 which indicates that, for the period 1991-2010, the director trading 
value in June is the highest relative to other months of the year. The null hypothesis which states that director 
trading value is the same across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent level (based on an 
F-test). In addition, director trading value appears to be slightly lower in August. A comparison of June versus 
other months indicates a tendency for June to become more active. These results are repeated (the non-existence 
of monthly anomalies) after excluding trades with more than £15 but not after using TOBIT Model. The results 
of TOBIT Regression Model show that the average value of directors‟ selling activities in March is higher and 
significantly different relative to other months of the year. The average value of March‟s sells is £64 million, 
which suggests that directors prefer to trade more in this month. 
Table 10 also shows that the average number of directors‟ trades in March and April is the highest relative to 
other months of the year. The average trading number on March and April are approximately the same (145 
transactions). March and April‟s trading numbers are significantly different from the trading numbers of the 
remaining months. The null hypothesis which assumes that the average number of directors‟ trades is the same 
across all months of the year can be rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). 
Excluding March and April, the null hypothesis which assumes that the average number of directors‟ trades is the 
same cannot be rejected. Back to Hypothesis (3), the results indicate no month of the year effect in aggregate 
directors‟ trading value (when using OLS Models). These results changed when using TOBIT Model suggesting 
the existence of March effects. The results also show that March‟s and April‟s number of trades are more 
frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (3) is rejected for director aggregate number of trades and accepted for 
directors‟ aggregate value and volume.  
Also, Hypothesis (4), which suggests that Directors tend to sell more in March compared to other months of the 
year, is accepted. These results can be explained by tax loss selling hypothesis (March sell pressure) which 
suggests that investors sell more in the month prior to taxation date or capital gain hypothesis which states that 
investors delay capital gains realisation so that they can delay tax payment on capital gains. By doing so, 
investors might postpone tax payment by one year. Thus, investors would sell winners (shares) in April. Hence, 
the selling pressure in March would be small causing the price to rise. 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero.    
Hillier and Marshall (2002a) suggested that insiders sell more 20 days before taxation date. In the UK, 5th of 
April is the taxation date. Therefore, we might expect insiders to sell more in the last two weeks of March and 
first week of April. For that reason, we re-examined calendar anomalies in aggregate insider activities as 
measured by the aggregate number of insider transactions in the last two weeks of March and First week of April 
(weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15). The evidence indicates, as can be seen from Table 11, that the average number of sell 
transactions in these weeks is significantly different from the average number of sell trades in other weeks. The 
average trading number on weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15 are approximately 53 transactions. 
 
Table 11. The results of dummy variable regression on directors‟ sells on weekly basis 
Weeks Coefficients  Standard Error  T-test  P-Value  F-test 
Weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15 52.84 2.15 24.59 0 207.49 
Other Weeks 20.59 0.63 32.75 0  
 
The estimation equation is;  
𝑇𝑕𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 12,13,14,𝑎𝑛𝑑 15𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 12,13,14,𝑎𝑛𝑑 15 + 𝛽𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝑊𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 
Where 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 12,13,14,𝑎𝑛𝑑 15 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trade occurred in weeks 12, 13, 14, 
and 15 and 0 otherwise.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the average number of sell trades over the weeks of the year. The figure shows 
that the average number of sell trades increase at week 12 and peak at week 15. Thereafter, a decrease in the 
average number of sell trades in the following three weeks (weeks 16, 17, and 18). This supports the view that 
directors sell more before the taxation.  
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Figure 3. The distribution of the average number of directors‟ sells over sample weeks 
 
To summarise, the results of OLS Regression Model indicate that there is no monthly anomalies in aggregate 
insider selling activities as measured by the aggregate value of insider transactions. The results of TOBIT 
Regression Model show that the average value of directors‟ selling activities in March is higher and significantly 
different relative to other months of the year. 
In UK, April is the month of taxation. According to the tax-loss hypothesis, investors sell more in the month 
before the taxation and buy more after taxation. Therefore, these results might be due to directors selling more to 
avoid taxes. This is confirmed when we looked at directors‟ sell 20 days before the taxation. 
6.4 The Results of K-W Statistic Test 
Table 12 reports the results of K-W statistic test for insider aggregate value and number of directors‟ buys and 
sells. The table supports the results of the OLS regression model and confirms the existence of monthly anomaly 
in aggregate director trading activities (measured by the number of director transactions). Also, when 
considering buy and sell transactions as a whole, the results indicate a kind of day of the week anomaly.  
Unlike the previous findings, there seems to be a day of the week effect in director aggregate value of buy trades. 
This difference might happen normally when OLS regression model assumptions are not met completely 
(Brooks, 2014; and Lim et al., 2010). 
 
Table 12. The results of K-W statistic test 
  Buy Sell All Trades 
  Value No of Trades Value No of Trades Value No of Trades 
  Day-Of-The week 
chi-squared 11.05 13.21 7.75 11.72 13.712 18.539 
p-value 0.0259 0.0102 0.101 0.0196 0.0083 0.001 
  Month-Of-The year 
chi-squared 14.81 27.98 13.49 55.62 13.08 43.44 
p-value 0.1912 0.0032 0.2625 0.0001 0.2879 0.0001 
 
To summarise, the results show the following: 
1) There is a day of the week anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as measured by number and value of 
insider transactions). More specifically, insiders tend to trade more on Fridays and less on Tuesdays. This 
anomaly disappeared for directors‟ aggregate value when splitting the sample to directors‟ buys and sells. 
The existence of Tuesday effects was previously conducted in stock returns (Agrawal & Tandon, 1994; 








Average number of Sell Trades
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2) The distribution of the average value of directors‟ trades (buys and sells) across the week days forms a U 
shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday).  
3) There is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as measured by the number of insider 
transactions). More specifically, insiders tend to trade more in March (in the aggregate number) and trade 
less in August. For directors‟ buys, insider aggregate buying activities are higher in December and March, 
whereas, for directors‟ sells, insider aggregate selling activities are higher in April. These results are 
consistent with Seyhun (1988b) and Hillier and Marshall (2002a).  
4) The results of K-W statistic test confirm the nonexistence of monthly anomaly in aggregate director trading 
(measured by value of director transactions). Unlike the previous findings, there seems to be a day of the 
week effect in director aggregate value of buy trades, which might happen normally when OLS regression 
model assumptions are not met completely. 
7. Conclusions 
One aim of this study was to test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions (as measured by 
the aggregate insider number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to trade on any 
particular day of the week or month of the year?  
The literature in this paper has attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to 
explain their existence. It indicated the existence of the day of the week effect .i.e. negative returns in the 
beginning of the week and high returns at the end of the week. These anomalies might be driven by the 
employed methodology or the way of calculating returns, investor psychology, the difference in trading patterns 
of individual and institutional investors, or settlement procedures. Furthermore, the literature on trading volume 
suggests that Monday‟s trading volume is higher compared to other days of the week. More specifically, 
investors sell more on Monday if they are individual investors and sell less if they are institutional investors. 
This is perhaps due to private information hypothesis and the behaviour of individual and institutional investors. 
Similarly, previous empirical literature on stock returns anomalies supports the existence of the month of the 
year effect i.e. high returns in January. These anomalies might be driven by the tax loss selling hypothesis, 
window dressing hypothesis, or new information provided by the firms at the end of the financial year. Also, the 
turn of the year effect might be due to director trading activities as measured by the aggregate number of 
directors‟ trades.  
A second aim of this paper, given that such seasonal patterns exist, was to attempt to relate these patterns to 
explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies. Using a dataset of more than 5,000 UK companies 
over the period January 1991 to December 2010 resulting in 91,970 trades, 70,067 buys and 22,026 sells, we 
carried out a series of parametric (OLS) and non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests to determine whether there is 
a calendar effects or not.  
Our results indicated the following: There is a day of the week anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as 
measured by number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, insiders tend to trade more on Fridays and 
less on Tuesdays. The distribution of the average value of directors‟ trades (buys and sells) across the week days 
forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). 
There is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as measured by the number of insider 
transactions). Specifically, insiders tend to trade more in March (in the aggregate number) and trade less in 
August. For directors‟ buys, insider aggregate buying activities are higher in December and March, whereas, for 
directors‟ sells, insider aggregate selling activities are higher in April. These results are consistent with Seyhun 
(1988b) and Hillier and Marshall (2002a). The average number of sell transactions in the three weeks before 
taxation date is significantly different from the average number of sells trades in other weeks 
These results are also confirmed by the results of K-W statistic test which supported the non-existence of 
monthly anomaly in aggregate director trading (measured by the value of director transactions). Unlike the 
previous findings, there seems to be a day of the week effect in director aggregate value of buy trades.  
The existence of Friday (Tuesday) effects was previously conducted in stock returns (Agrawal & Tandon; 
Martikainen & Puttonen, 1996; and Brooks & Persand, 2001). One possible explanation, based on the previous 
studies, is that insiders act like institutional investors who trade less on Tuesday as a reflection of insiders‟ trades 
on Monday in US. Taking into accounts that the aim of the previous studies in trading volume anomalies was to 
explain the calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results were consistent with studies on stock returns 
anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might 
explain the seasonal pattern in stock returns. 
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The U shape pattern (in average value of directors‟ trades) is perhaps due to price changes from larger (smaller) 
trades which are higher (lower) at the beginning and end of the week. This is because smaller trades would move 
prices during periods of low volume because informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the 
market. When volume is low, informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume hides 
their information (Blau et al., 2012). 
The existence of March and April anomalies can be explained by tax loss selling hypothesis (March sell pressure) 
which suggests that investors sell more in the month prior to taxation date or capital gain hypothesis which states 
that investors delay capital gains realisation so that they can delay tax payment on capital gains. By doing so, 
investors might postpone tax payment by one year. Thus, investors would sell winners (shares) in April. Hence, 
the selling pressure in March would be small causing the price to rise. Tax loss selling hypothesis, as an 
explanation of March and April anomalies, further supported when we examined directors‟ sell transactions 
twenty days before taxation date. Although the purpose of this paper is purely to identify whether such anomalies 
exist, we do not attempt to explain why they do. We believe that this is an avenue for further research in this 
area. 
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